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731 
THE EXECUTIONERS‘ DILEMMAS 
Eric Berger *  
INTRODUCTION 
When people learn that I study lethal injection, they are usual-
ly curious to know more (or at least they are polite enough to ask 
questions). Interestingly, the question that arises most often—
from lawyers, law students, and laypeople—is why states behave 
as they do. In the wake of botched executions and ample evidence 
of lethal injection‘s dangers, why do states fail to address their 
execution procedures‘ systemic risks? Similarly, why do states so 
vigorously resist requests to disclose their execution procedures‘ 
details?  
This symposium essay takes a stab at answering these ques-
tions. In the interest of full disclosure, I should admit that I first 
came to these cases as a litigator challenging the constitutionality 
of the procedures in question.
1
 During these cases, I became con-
vinced—and remain convinced—that some states (perhaps many) 
do not devote sufficient care to their lethal injection procedures 
and that consequently those procedures can create a substantial 
risk of serious pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment‘s pro-
hibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
2
 Though many states‘ 
procedures have changed in important ways in the past few 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. I thank Ginger 
Anders, Anne Duncan, Jim Gibson, Megan McCracken, and the participants in the Uni-
versity of Richmond Law Review‘s Allen Chair Symposium on Lethal Injection, Politics, 
and the Future of the Death Penalty for extremely helpful suggestions on earlier drafts. I 
also thank Nate Clark and Krystia Reed for splendid research assistance and Leah Stieg-
ler, Sheherezade Malik, and the other wonderful editors of the University of Richmond 
Law Review for organizing this symposium. A McCollum Grant helped support the writing 
of this symposium contribution. 
 1. While in private practice, I worked on Michael Taylor‘s lethal injection challenge 
in the Western District of Missouri and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit, and Clarence Hill‘s case in the Supreme Court of the United States. See Brief for 
Petitioner, Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006) (No. 05-8794), 2006 WL 558284; Taylor 
v. Crawford (No. 05-4173-CV-C-FJG), 2006 WL 1779035 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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years, the recent record of mistakes and botched executions sup-
ports this conclusion.
3
 
Scholarship in this area aptly documents lethal injection‘s 
risks, so I will only briefly summarize those dangers here.
4
 In-
stead, this essay ponders why states insist on carrying on as they 
always have when the problems seem so egregious. I admit that 
my contribution here is speculative; it is impossible to know for 
certain what drives state officials‘ behavior. (Even if we were to 
ask state officials, it is doubtful they would all give a fully candid 
answer. Some of them might not even know themselves.) I also 
fully concede that motivations differ from state to state, and even 
from official to official. Politicians, correctional officials, and exe-
cution team members all likely have different motives for their 
behavior.
5
 States may also keep their procedures secret for one 
reason and refuse to revise them for other reasons. Finally, I 
acknowledge that some states are more careful than others, and 
that while there are surely bad actors, there are also responsible 
officials who work hard to create safe and painless execution 
methods. 
That all said, some states do not design careful execution pro-
cedures, and to the extent such states often vigorously deny that 
anything is wrong and fight to keep their procedure details a se-
cret, this article seeks to explore the many reasons behind such 
behavior. Execution team members and department of corrections 
officials face various pressures that often make them prioritize 
 
 3. See infra Part I. 
 4. See Eric Berger, Lethal Injection and the Problem of Constitutional Remedies, 27 
YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 259, 260–62 (2009) [hereinafter Berger, Remedies] (explaining how 
certain lethal injection procedures create a substantial risk of excruciating pain); Eric 
Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment Due Process, 55 B.C. L. REV. 
1367, 1371–72 (2014) [hereinafter Berger, Secrecy]; Deborah W. Denno, Lethal Injection 
Chaos Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1331, 1335–39 (2014) [hereinafter Denno, Chaos] (discuss-
ing the history of lethal injection in the U.S. and the lack of medical testing of lethal injec-
tion); Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled 
the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 59 (2007) [hereinafter Denno, Quandary] (dis-
cussing the need for a humane method of execution); Deborah W. Denno, When Legisla-
tures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Le-
thal Injection and What it Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 65–69 (2002) [hereinafter 
Denno, Paradox] (concluding that justice does not exist with the current methods of execu-
tion). 
 5. For ease of presentation, I organize my discussion by type of explanation rather 
than kind of state official. Some explanations apply to various levels of state actors. How-
ever, as I indicate in places, some explanations help clarify certain governmental actors‘ 
behaviors better than others. 
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factors other than execution safety.
6
 Of course, it is impossible in 
a short symposium contribution to fully explore all the states‘ 
reasons, but given the disconnect between lethal injection‘s critics 
and state officials‘ behavior, it is a valuable exercise. 
Part I briefly summarizes lethal injection‘s risks, states‘ efforts 
to keep key details of their procedures secret, and states‘ refusal 
to address the systemic risks posed by those procedures. Part II 
explores potential reasons for state behavior, offering epistemic, 
structural, strategic, and political explanations. Part III con-
cludes by noting that this analysis likely is relevant beyond the 
lethal injection setting and can help us better understand official 
motivations when states violate constitutional rights in other ar-
eas as well. 
I.  THE PROBLEM 
The dangers of lethal injection have been well rehearsed else-
where, so I will offer only a short summary here.
7
 In the past two 
years, there have been botched executions in South Dakota (Eric 
Robert), Oklahoma (Michael Lee Wilson and Clayton Lockett), 
Arizona (Joseph Wood), and Ohio (Dennis McGuire).
8
 The failures 
 
 6. A ―safe‖ execution or drug in the lethal injection context is one that does not pose a 
substantial risk of serious pain, thereby complying with the Eighth Amendment standard 
announced by the Supreme Court in Baze v. Rees. See 553 U.S. 35, 52 (2008) (plurality 
opinion). Obviously, to the extent the drugs are used to cause the death of a human being, 
they are not ―safe‖ in the common sense of the word. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 
1382–87. 
 7. For a more comprehensive review of recent problems, see Denno, Chaos, supra 
note 4, at 1341 (discussing how states have not attempted to medically improve on lethal 
injection procedures that are consistently problematic). See also Berger, Secrecy, supra 
note 4, at 1371. 
 8. See Erik Eckholm, Arizona Takes Nearly 2 Hours to Execute Inmate, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 23, 2014, at A1 [hereinafter Eckholm, Arizona] (discussing how Joseph Wood gasped 
repeatedly and took nearly two hours to die after being injected); Erik Eckholm, One Exe-
cution Botched, Oklahoma Delays the Next, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.ny 
times.com/2014/04/30/us/oklahoma-executions.html [hereinafter Eckholm, Botched] (dis-
cussing how Clayton Lockett twitched, gasped, called out, ―Oh man,‖ mumbled, shook his 
foot, and raised up off the gurney after being injected); Dana Ford & Ashley Fantz, Con-
troversial Execution in Ohio Uses New Drug Combination, CNN (Jan. 17, 2014, 1:01 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/16/justice/ohio-dennis-mcguire-execution/ (discussing how 
Dennis McGuire gasped, snorted deeply multiple times, and appeared to be choking after 
being injected); Jason Hancock, Execution Secrecy Draws Criticism in Missouri, KAN. CITY 
STAR (Feb. 7, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.joliejustus.com/execution_secrecy_draws_crit 
icism_in_missouri (discussing how Michael Lee Wilson cried out, ―I feel my whole body 
burning‖ after being injected with pentobarbital); Steve Young, Execution: South Dakota 
Delivers Eric Robert His Death Wish, ARGUSLEADER.COM (Oct. 16, 2012), http://archive.ar 
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have occurred in one-drug, two-drug, and three-drug procedures, 
and they have sometimes been gruesome. Clayton Lockett, for in-
stance, twitched and gasped, while a prison official called out 
―Man . . . something‘s wrong.‖
9
 He then mumbled, shook his foot, 
and started convulsing violently, trying to rise up off the gurney.
10
 
Prison officials subsequently discovered a ―vein failure‖ because 
―the line had blown.‖
11
 During Joseph Wood‘s execution, the in-
mate gasped over 600 times and took nearly two hours to die.
12
 
To lethal injection‘s critics, these recent botches are confirma-
tion of a problem they have long known to exist. Many states re-
tain the three-drug procedure, which contains two drugs that 
cause excruciating pain in people who are inadequately anesthe-
tized.
13
 The procedure uses an anesthetic (usually thiopental or 
pentobarbital), a paralytic inhibiting muscle movement (usually 
pancuronium bromide or vecuronium bromide), and potassium 
chloride, which induces cardiac arrest and stops the heart.
14
 It is 
undisputed that potassium chloride causes agonizing pain as it 
sears its way through the veins to the heart.
15
 It is furthermore 
undisputed that the paralytic masks such pain.
16
 Because pancu-
ronium bromide paralyzes the diaphragm, it also causes the terri-
fying sensation of suffocation.
17
 The constitutionality of the three-
drug procedure therefore depends primarily on whether the first 
 
gusleader.com/article/20121016/NEWS/310160016/Execution-South-Dakota-delivers-Eric-
Robert-his-death-wish (discussing how Eric Robert gasped and snorted heavily, turned 
purple, and took twenty minutes to die). 
 9. See Eckholm, Botched, supra note 8. 
 10. See id.; Greg Botelho & Dana Ford, Oklahoma Stops Execution After Botching 
Drug Delivery; Inmate Dies, CNN (Oct. 9, 2014, 2:55 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/ 
29/us/oklahoma-botched-execution/. 
 11. See Botelho & Ford, supra note 10; Eckholm, Botched, supra note 8.  
 12. See Eckholm, Arizona, supra note 8; Arizona Botches Execution of Joseph Wood, 
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/5828 (last visited Feb. 
27, 2015).  
 13. See Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1359 (providing a chart listing fourteen states 
retaining some version of the three-drug protocol). 
 14. See id. at 1333–34, 1349, 1359. As Professor Denno‘s study shows, there is sub-
stantial variation in procedures among the states. Id. at 1359. 
 15. See Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 883 (M.D. Tenn. 2007); Mark 
Dershwitz & Thomas K. Henthorn, The Pharmacokinetics and Pharmacodynamics of Thi-
opental as Used in Lethal Injection, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 931, 931 (2008). 
 16. Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 883–84. 
 17. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 55 (2007) (plurality opinion); Harbison, 511 F. 
Supp. 2d at 883–84. 
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drug, the anesthetic, takes proper effect.
18
 If it does, the inmate is 
fully anesthetized within two-and-one-half minutes.
19
 If it does 
not, the paralyzed inmate may seem peaceful while experiencing 
the dual agony of suffocation and intense burning throughout his 
body.
20
 
It is bad enough that many states still employ a procedure us-
ing drugs that indisputably cause excruciating pain in the im-
properly anesthetized.
21
 It is far worse that states‘ unqualified 
personnel considerably heighten the procedure‘s dangers.
22
 The 
list of mistakes that states have made is astounding. States have 
misunderstood the drugs, believing, for instance, that they ought 
to be injected in rapid succession, not realizing that the anesthet-
ic requires a couple of minutes to take effect.
23
 Of course, if the 
other drugs are injected before the anesthetic has taken effect, 
the inmate will suffer excruciating pain but be paralyzed and 
therefore appear peaceful. 
States have also had serious problems setting the catheter con-
necting the intravenous (―IV‖) line with the inmates‘ veins. If the 
IV line is improperly set, the drugs will not all be delivered suc-
cessfully into the vein but will instead infiltrate, leaking into sur-
rounding tissues.
24
 Infiltration itself is excruciating, and it can al-
so result in inadequate anesthesia.
25
 Some states‘ failure to 
employ qualified personnel to set the IV line heightens the risk of 
infiltration,
26
 as does the fact that states do not always provide 
their execution teams with the proper equipment to safely set the 
catheter.
27
 Catheter problems contributed substantially to the 
 
 18. See Ty Alper, Anesthetizing the Public Conscience: Lethal Injection and Animal 
Euthanasia, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 817, 818–20 (2008). 
 19. See Henthorn Expert Report at ¶ 24, Taylor v. Crawford (No. 05-4173), 2006 WL 
1236660 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006) [hereinafter Henthorn Report] (explaining the speed 
with which thiopental takes effect). 
 20. See Dershwitz & Henthorn, supra note 15, at 933–36. 
 21. As of 2014, fourteen states still retained some version of the three-drug protocol. 
See Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1359. 
 22. See Berger, Remedies, supra note 4, at 270. 
 23. See id. at 268 (noting that Missouri executioners injected drugs as quickly as pos-
sible because they incorrectly believed the prisoner would be unconscious within fifteen 
seconds); see also Deposition of Larry Crawford at 130, Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035.  
 24. See Berger, Remedies, supra note 4, at 270. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1377, 1433. 
 27. See OKLA. DEP‘T OF PUB. SAFETY, The Execution of Clayton D. Lockett: Executive 
Summary 16, http://www.dps.state.ok.us/Investigation/14-0189SI%20Summary.pdf (last 
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botched executions of Clayton Lockett in Oklahoma and Angel 
Diaz in Florida.
28
 
States also have had difficulty accurately assessing the in-
mate‘s anesthetic depth, believing an inmate to be unconscious 
when he was not.
29
 As a result, states have sometimes injected the 
second and third drugs before an inmate was sufficiently anesthe-
tized.
30
 Further compounding all these problems, states often fail 
to provide sufficient oversight, transparency, and contingency 
plans for their procedures.
31
 These failures collectively heighten 
the risk that lethal injection will result in excruciating pain. 
In theory, the switch in several states from a three-drug proto-
col to a one-drug protocol should mitigate these problems by elim-
inating the drugs that create a risk of pain. In reality, though, 
states have had difficulty finding safe drugs. For example, in re-
sponse to recent drug shortages, many states have sought drugs 
from compounding pharmacies. Compounding pharmacies usual-
ly mix small quantities of drugs to order, but because they elude 
many Food and Drug Administration (―FDA‖) regulations, their 
products are rarely evaluated for safety and effectiveness.
32
 Com-
pounding pharmacies also often use active pharmaceutical ingre-
dients from complex and unsecured supply chains that can be di-
verted through ―grey markets,‖ making it impossible to verify 
whether the ingredients conform to FDA requirements.
33
 It is also 
not uncommon for compounding pharmacies‘ ingredients to be 
 
visited Feb. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Lockett Execution Report] (noting that the staff did not 
have access to a long enough catheter to attempt a femoral insertion but that the staff at-
tempted femoral access anyway). 
 28. Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1433. 
 29. See Eckholm, Botched, supra note 8; Ford & Fantz, supra note 8 (noting that after 
Lockett had been declared unconscious, the state administered the second and third drugs, 
at which point Lockett began gasping and bucking on the gurney). 
 30. See Locket Execution Report, supra note 27, at 11–12, 25. 
 31. See Berger, Remedies, supra note 4, at 272 (noting that some states have incon-
sistent procedures, poor recordkeeping, and no contingency plans to address problems that 
may arise). 
 32. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1382. 
 33. See John L. Chollet & Michael J. Jozwiakowski, Quality Investigation of Hydroxy-
progesterone Caproate Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient and Injection, 38 DRUG DEV. IND. 
PHARM. 540, 543 (2012) (noting that many sources of active pharmaceutical ingredients 
were ―brokers who import and repackage drugs‖ and who had neither registered with nor 
been inspected by the FDA); see also Declaration of Larry D. Sasich at ¶ 12, Taylor v. 
Apothecary Shoppe, LLC (No. 14-CV-063) 2014, WL 631664 (N.D. Okla. Feb 18, 2014) 
[hereinafter Sasich Declaration]. 
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mislabeled, resulting in final products that are not what they 
purport to be.
34
 
Compounding pharmacies perform an important service by 
mixing small batches of drugs to order, but they are licensed to 
dispense drugs, not to manufacture them.
35
 Consequently, they 
often lack the basic infrastructure necessary to produce, for in-
stance, sterile, potent, and safe injectable pentobarbital, which 
many lethal injection states now use in either one-drug or three-
drug procedures.
36
 Moreover, FDA pharmacy inspections have 
found, with alarming frequency, that compounding pharmacies 
and similar facilities purporting to produce sterile drug products 
did not follow procedures designed to prevent microbiological con-
tamination of those products.
37
 In short, many compounding 
pharmacies‘ practices exacerbate the risk that their products will 
be seriously impure, contaminated, sub-potent, super-potent, or 
otherwise flawed.
38
 Unsurprisingly, problems with compounded 
 
 34. See Editorial, Compounding Pharmacies Need FDA Oversight, WASH. POST (Oct. 
16, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/compounding-pharmacies-need-fda-ov 
ersight/2012/10/16/12e5ee78-17af-11e2-9855-71f2b202721b_story.html. 
 35. See Bette Hileman, Drug Regulation, C&EN, Apr. 12, 2004, at 24 (discussing the 
lack of regulation and capacities of compounding pharmacies). 
 36. See Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1359; Jennifer Gudeman et al., Potential Risks 
of Pharmacy Compounding, 13 DRUGS IN R&D 1, 3 (2012) (explaining that some com-
pounding pharmacies have expanded their activities beyond their technological capabili-
ties and that ―poor practices on the part of drug compounders can result in contamination 
or in products that do not possess the strength, quality, and purity required‖ for a safe 
drug); Mark Thomas et al., I.V. Admixture Contamination Rates: Traditional Practice Site 
Versus a Class 1000 Cleanroom, 62 AM. J. HEALTH-SYST. PHARM. 2386, 2386 (2005) (find-
ing the contamination in compounded medication even when technicians compounded it in 
sterile environments, such as a cleanroom); Sasich Declaration, supra note 33, at ¶ 12. 
 37. See DEP‘T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., INSPECTION FOR ABRAMS ROYAL PHARMACY 
(Dec. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Pharmaceutical Safety Overview], available at http://www. 
fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofGlobalRegulatoryOperationsandPoli 
cy/ORA/ORAElectronicReadingRoom/UCM379743.pdf. 
 38. Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1384; see Sasich Declaration, supra note 33, at ¶ 
12; Phil Johnson & Gregg Jones, Pharmacist Compounding of Analgestic Medication: The 
Risk of a Little-Known Practice, 84 J. FLA. M.A. 13, 14 (1997) (discussing how compounded 
products are never tested as rigorously as a commercial product); 2006 Limited FDA Sur-
vey of Compounded Drug Products, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Guidance Complian-
ceRegulatoryInformation/PharmacyCompounding/ucm204237.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 
2015) (noting at least 240 instances of illness and death associated with compounded 
drugs between 1990 and 2005); Pharmaceutical Safety Overview, supra note 37. 
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drugs have caused public health emergencies,
39
 and have also 
played a role in recent botched executions.
40
 
Despite these botches and dangers, states often act as though 
there is no problem. Indeed, states repeatedly deny that their le-
thal injection procedures pose a risk of pain.
41
 They similarly re-
fuse to conduct a careful, systematic review of their procedures‘ 
dangers.
42
 This is not to say that states never change their proce-
dures. On the contrary, they change them frequently.
43
 But these 
changes often do not make the procedures safer. For example, af-
ter Ohio experienced serious problems with its three-drug proce-
dure, it designed a convoluted two-part protocol, which included a 
back-up plan requiring the team to inject an overdose of two 
drugs never before used in executions.
44
 Though experts warned 
that these back-up drugs, hydromorphone and midazolam ―could 
 
 39. See Todd Wallack, Victims of Tainted Drug Face Long Wait for Relief, BOS. GLOBE 
(Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/10/01/new-england-compounding-
victims-still-waiting-for-compensation-year-after-meningitis-outbreak/3zUCXAnXtTC21Y 
g4AQR3tI/story.html (discussing contaminated steroids from a Massachusetts compound-
ing pharmacy that recently caused fungal meningitis in approximately 750 people, at least 
sixty-four of whom died). 
 40. See Sasich Declaration, supra note 33, at ¶¶ 61–63; Hancock, supra note 8; Elliot 
C. McLaughlin, Appeals Court Stays Texas Execution After Intellectual Disability Claim, 
CNN (May 14, 2014, 8:07 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/13/justice/texas-execution-rob 
ert-james-campbell/ (noting that Luis Villegas ―complained of a burning sensation during 
his April execution‖ in Texas using compounded pentobarbital); South Dakota Covers Up 
Source of ‘DIY’ Death Penalty Drugs Ahead of Execution, REPRIEVE (Oct. 30, 2012), http:// 
www.reprieve.org.uk/press/2012_10_30_South_Dakota_execution_drugs/; Young, supra 
note 8. 
 41. See, e.g., Ben Brumfield et al., No Evidence Arizona Execution Botched, Correc-
tions Chief Says, CNN (Sept. 8, 2014, 7:15 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/24/justice/ 
arizona-execution-controversy/index.html (discussing the denial by the director of the Ari-
zona Department of Corrections that Joseph Wood suffered during his execution); Josh 
Levs et al., Oklahoma’s Botched Lethal Injection Marks New Front in Battle Over Execu-
tions, CNN (Sept. 8, 2014, 7:16 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/30/us/oklahoma-botched-
execution/index.html (discussing Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin‘s declaration that Lock-
ett was declared unconscious prior to his execution); Stephanie Mencimer, Arizona’s Terri-
ble Lethal Injection Track Record, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 1, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www. 
motherjones.com/politics/2014/08/arizonas-terrible-lethal-injection-track-record (discuss-
ing the Arizona Corrections Chief‘s statement that the execution of Robert Comer was ac-
complished with ―careful planning,‖ even though they hired a doctor who Arizona knew 
had been banned from participating in executions in Missouri). 
 42. See, e.g., Lethal Injection: Texas Switches to New Drug as Next Execution Ap-
proaches, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/lethal-injection-
texas-switches-new-drug-next-execution-approaches (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).  
 43. See Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1335. 
 44. See id. at 1357. 
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produce a slow, lingering death‖ and induce a state of confusion 
and extreme psychological anguish, the state still stuck with it.
45
 
If anything, the constant changes make lethal injection all the 
more unpredictable, as states‘ execution procedures often differ 
dramatically not only from state to state but within the same 
state.
46
 Indeed, some states swerve haphazardly from one proce-
dure to another, reacting to mistakes or botches by attempting 
quick fixes that leave other problems unaddressed. Oklahoma, for 
instance, hastily revised its procedure after the botched execution 
of Michael Lee Wilson, only to botch Clayton Lockett‘s execution 
just a few months later.
47
 The State then changed its procedure 
again, but rather than taking the time to do so carefully, it 
rushed to complete the revision to continue executions as expedi-
tiously as possible.
48
 Though serious questions remained about its 
new procedure, on January 15, 2015, Oklahoma executed Charles 
Warner, who called out from the gurney, ―My body is on fire.‖
49
 
Two days later, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Glossip 
v. Gross to review Oklahoma‘s approach.
50
 
Other states, without any better idea of how to proceed, simply 
imitate other states‘ procedures, without regard to those states‘ 
records. For example, after contaminated compounded drugs con-
tributed to a botched execution in South Dakota, Pennsylvania 
announced it would also use the same kind of compounded 
drugs.
51
 Similarly, despite serious problems in Arizona with mid-
azolam, Alabama, Ohio, Oklahoma, and other states have recent-
ly revised their procedures to include midazolam.
52
 Thus, as Pro-
 
 45. See Cooey v. Strickland, 604 F.3d 939, 942–43 (6th Cir. 2010); Denno, Chaos, su-
pra note 4, at 1357. 
 46. See Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1335. 
 47. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1386. 
 48. See ASSOC. PRESS, State Prepares to Resume Executions, But Questions Linger, 
MUSKOGEE PHX. (Oct. 5, 2014, 12:03 AM), http://www.muskogeephoenix.com/news/oklaho 
ma_news/article_e26c0b36-4c4c-11e4-8666-17ea756064ce.html [hereinafter Questions 
Linger]. 
 49. Dana Ford, Oklahoma Executes Charles Warner, CNN (Jan. 16, 2015, 6:13 AM), 
http:// www.cnn.com/2015/01/15/us/oklahoma-execution-charles-frederick-warner/. 
 50. Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721 (10th Cir. Jan. 12, 2015), cert. granted sub nom., 
Glossip v. Gross, 83 U.S.L.W. 3625 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2015) (No. 14-7955). 
 51. See Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1376–77; Young, supra note 8. 
 52. See ASSOC. PRESS, Judge Allows Okla. to Continue Executions After Botched Case; 
Opponents Had Argued Against New Protocol, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 23, 2014, at A7, 4; Tim 
Lockette, Stay Upheld for Death Row Inmate Thomas Arthur, ANNISTON STAR, Jan. 6, 
2015, at 3. 
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fessor Deborah Denno contends, despite the ―continuous tinker-
ing,‖ states have failed to grapple with lethal injection‘s most 
troubling aspects, such as underqualified executioners, a lack of 
medical expertise, and a ―failure to account for the difficulties 
with injecting inmates whose drug-use histories diminish the 
availability of usable veins.‖
53
 
The problem, then, is often not that states refuse to modify 
their procedures, but rather that in so doing they often fail to ad-
dress lethal injection‘s systemic dangers.
54
 Rather than deliber-
ately and carefully designing a new procedure, they often rush to 
address crises created by drug shortages and botched executions 
in the hopes of resuming executions without significant delay.
55
 If 
anything, as Professor Denno argues, ―As states‘ desperation in-
creases, so does their tolerance for risk.‖
56
  
It is important to acknowledge that there may be exceptions to 
this mostly dismal record. For example, though many states have 
had difficulty finding safe drugs, the switch in some states to a 
one-drug procedure should, in theory, make lethal injection safer. 
Relatedly, whereas most states fight vigorously to conceal the de-
tails of their procedures, Delaware‘s Department of Justice found 
that the Department of Corrections violated the State‘s Freedom 
of Information Act by denying a reporter‘s request for access to 
the procedure.
57
 Additionally, several states do not have a record 
of visibly botched executions. 
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that while some 
states have behaved better than others, many states have revised 
their procedures because they thought that they had no choice, 
not because they have voluntarily sought ways to improve their 
procedures. For example, Ohio was the first state to switch to a 
one-drug protocol, but it did so because a court ordered this rem-
 
 53. Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1335. 
 54. See, e.g., id. at 1337; Kate Brumback, Georgia to Use Compounding Pharmacy; 
State Needs Drug for Man’s Execution, AUGUSTA CHRON., July 12, 2013, at B6. 
 55. See, e.g., Questions Linger, supra note 48 (describing Oklahoma‘s efforts to put in 
place a new procedure following botches in time to conduct an execution in November 2014 
even though, as a critic pointed out, it was ―an awfully short time‖). 
 56. Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1336. 
 57. See Freedom of Information Act Appeal Concerning Department of Correction, 
Del. Op. Att‘y Gen. 11-IIB14, 2011 WL 4062225, at *1 (2011); Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, 
at 1380. 
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edy.
58
 Similarly, when a state badly botches an execution, it often 
feels pressure to revise the procedure.
59
 Drug shortages have also 
forced states to modify their procedures in recent years.
60
 These 
changes have not necessarily made things better. To the extent 
states frequently now turn to compounding pharmacies, they may 
in fact make the procedures more dangerous.
61
 In short, though 
the point can be overstated, on the whole, states have oftentimes 
tried to keep secret and defend even the sketchiest lethal injec-
tion procedures. 
II.  EXPLANATIONS 
Numerous explanations help shed light on state officials‘ be-
havior. Admittedly, this analysis is largely speculative. It is im-
possible to get into the executioner‘s head, and motives likely dif-
fer from person to person and from state to state. Additionally, 
some explanations speak to both state secrecy and state intransi-
gence (i.e., unwillingness to modify seriously flawed procedures), 
whereas some speak to just one or the other. In short, the theo-
ries offered here do not purport to explain every instance of state 
behavior in lethal injection. Instead, they try to shed some gen-
eral light on why states in this area so often seem to disregard 
constitutional concerns. 
A.  Epistemological Explanations 
Perhaps the most straightforward explanation is that state of-
ficials simply believe that their execution procedures are safe.
62 
Many executions appear unproblematic, and states likely believe 
 
 58. See State v. Rivera (No. 04CR065940) 2008 WL 2784679, at *6 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 
June 10, 2008) (―[T]he use of two drugs in the lethal injection protocol (pancuronium bro-
mide and potassium chloride) creates an unnecessary and arbitrary risk that the con-
demned will experience an agonizing and painful death.‖); Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 
1354 (discussing Rivera). 
 59. See Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Botched Execution Could Renew ‘Cruel’ Challenges, 
OKLA. DAILY, May 1, 2014, at 1. 
 60. See Kevin Sack, Shortage of Widely Used Anesthetics Is Delaying Executions in 
Some States, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2010, at A23. 
 61. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1384; Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1366 
(discussing the risks associated with compounding pharmacies). 
 62. Cf. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 62 (2008) (plurality opinion) (―The firing squad, 
hanging, the electric chair, and the gas chamber have each in turn given way to more hu-
mane methods, culminating in today‘s consensus on lethal injection.‖). 
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that if an execution seems peaceful, then it must be painless. 
Some officials may then conclude that if nothing seems amiss, 
then nothing is. 
States, in fact, might have many reasons for believing that 
their lethal injection procedures are safe—some more justifiable 
than others. States using a one-drug procedure with an overdose 
of a barbiturate anesthetic might reason that a drug that only 
anesthetizes cannot cause pain, even if things do not proceed per-
fectly. Of course, because compounding pharmacies do not always 
use proper procedures to manufacture such drugs,
63
 even these 
theoretically ―safe‖ drugs can behave in unpredictable ways.
64
 As 
explained above, many compounding pharmacies‘ practices 
heighten the risk that their drugs will cause pain because they 
are dangerously contaminated, impure, or otherwise flawed.
65
 
Nevertheless, states may honestly believe that these drugs can-
not cause pain, especially given that inmates challenging the 
three-drug procedure have themselves argued that a one-drug 
approach would be safer.
66
 
Many states may also believe their procedures are safe because 
they have received some expert advice telling them that they are. 
Perhaps most prominently, Dr. Mark Dershwitz, an anesthesiolo-
gist and pharmacologist at the University of Massachusetts, has 
repeatedly testified on behalf of states‘ lethal injection proce-
dures.
67
 Other experts, of course, disagree. One prominent expert, 
in fact, thought it ―very unlikely that any other medical experts 
who are familiar with these drugs will be willing to support‖ some 
 
 63. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1382–83; Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1370 
(―As concern grew that some pharmacies were exceeding the scope of traditional com-
pounding practices, the FDA issued reports in 2003 and 2006 revealing the discovery of 
compounded drugs that failed safety and efficacy tests, as well as serious illnesses and 
deaths that had occurred in association with compounded drugs.‖). 
 64. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1383–84; J.H. Perrin, Comments on Drugs 
Difficult to Compound and the Quality of Chemicals to Be Used in Compounding, 25 DRUG 
DEV. & INDUS. PHARM. 553, 555 (1999) (explaining that compounded drugs for intravenous 
use should never be released without testing for sterility, pyrogens, and chemical anal-
yses). 
 65. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1432–33. 
 66. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 51, 57, Baze, 553 U.S. 35 (No. 07-5439).  
 67. Cf. Andrew Welsh-Huggins, States’ Leading Lethal Injection Expert Ends Role, 
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Aug. 21, 2014, at P5A (reporting that Mark Dershwitz, who testi-
fied on behalf of many states in lethal injection litigation, terminated his role when Ohio 
mistakenly divulged that it had contacted him with information about a problematic exe-
cution). 
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of the states‘ designed procedures.
68
 Nevertheless, a credible ex-
pert on their side may be enough to convince many state officials 
that they need not worry too much about what they are doing. 
Some officials may also believe their executions are safe, be-
cause they do not know enough to think otherwise. Simply put, 
many state politicians, officials, and execution team members do 
not understand the drugs and their risks. Arizona, for instance, 
understood its drugs so poorly that it injected fifteen separate 
doses of the drug cocktail into Joseph Wood.
69
 For years Missouri 
injected the drugs of its three-drug procedure in rapid succession, 
not realizing that the anesthetic required two-and-one-half 
minutes to take effect.
70
  
Other officials may understand in the abstract that lethal in-
jection poses risks but nevertheless fall prey to the heuristic bias 
that their state will not experience problems.
71
 Lethal injection, if 
properly implemented and administered, is not inherently unsafe. 
Officials may, therefore, reassure themselves that everything will 
proceed smoothly. In fact, this reassurance may prevent some of-
ficials from attending to important details that can minimize the 
risk of excruciating pain. 
Relatedly, even if some states realize that their procedures 
pose substantial risks of pain, they may lack the expertise to re-
vise the procedure meaningfully. Lethal injection is a complicated 
procedure that requires expertise at several steps along the way. 
To do it right, states need to take care that they select the right 
drugs, find a safe and reliable drug provider, prepare the chemi-
 
 68. See id. (quoting Dr. Mark Heath, a Columbia University anesthesiologist). 
 69. See Tom Dart, Arizona Inmate Joseph Wood Was Injected 15 Times with Execution 
Drugs, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2014, 10:40 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug / 
02/arizona-inmate-injected-15-times-execution-drugs-joseph-wood; Tierney Sneed, Can the 
Death Penalty Survive Lethal Injection?, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 7, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www. 
usnews.com/news/articles/2014/08/07/can-the-death-penalty-survive-lethal-injection. 
 70. See Defendant Crawford‘s Answers to Plaintiffs‘ First Interrogatories at 9, Taylor 
v. Crawford (No. 05-4173), 2006 WL 1779035 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006) (containing an ex-
planation by the Department of Corrections Director that lethal injection drugs are inject-
ed in rapid succession); Henthorn Report, supra note 19, at 7. 
 71. See generally Daniel P. Forbes, Are Some Entrepreneurs More Overconfident Than 
Others?, 20 J. BUS. VENTURING 623, 626 (2005) (describing the overconfidence bias); Paul 
C. Price et al., Perceived Event Frequency and the Optimistic Bias: Evidence for a Two-
Process Model of Personal Risk Judgments, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 242, 242–
43 (2002) (explaining that people typically demonstrate an optimism bias when they judge 
their risk of experiencing a negative event and believe their risk to be lower than the risk 
their peers face). 
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cals properly, insert the catheter correctly into the inmate‘s veins, 
accurately monitor the inmate‘s consciousness, and more.
72
 State 
departments of corrections (―DOCs‖) not only lack the expertise to 
perform most of these steps but may even lack the expertise to 
know where to find the correct experts. Moreover, even when 
states know enough to approach the right people, those people 
may be very reluctant to involve themselves in the business of 
killing people.
73
 In other words, the states‘ epistemological deficits 
may impede them both from recognizing and correcting problems. 
In fairness, it is important to acknowledge that some states 
might be correct that their procedures are safe.
74
 Several states 
have executed people without botches in recent years.
75
 Of course, 
it is impossible to know what an inmate feels during an execu-
tion. Moreover, states that continue to use pancuronium bromide 
or similar paralytics do not deserve the benefit of the doubt, be-
cause they deliberately use a drug that masks any pain the in-
mate might feel.
76
 To this extent, the absence of visible botches is 
hardly conclusive evidence that these states have not had prob-
lems. Nevertheless, it is possible that many—perhaps even 
most—apparently unproblematic executions are, in fact, painless, 
as they are supposed to be. To this extent, the absence of visible 
botches in some states is an indication (albeit non-determinative) 
that those states‘ procedures are smoother. 
While it seems likely that some state officials honestly believe 
that their states‘ procedures are safe, it is important to empha-
size that this epistemological explanation only goes so far. Indeed, 
there are many instances in which states have recognized prob-
lems and yet have decided to proceed anyway.
77
 For example, a 
report in Ohio revealed that Ohio prison officials had been con-
cerned about the drug combination used for Dennis McGuire but 
 
 72. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1427. 
 73. See Matt McCarthy, What’s the Best Way to Execute Someone?, SLATE (Mar. 27, 
2014, 11:44 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/20 
14/03/death_penalty_drugs_lethal_injection_executions_are_so_bad_that_it_s_time.html. 
 74. See Denise Grady, Three-Drug Protocol Persists for Lethal Injections, Despite Ease 
of Using One, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2014, at A16. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Dershwitz & Henthorn, supra note 15, at 931. 
 77. See, e.g., Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1356 n.159 (discussing Ohio‘s botched ex-
ecution of Rommel Broom, the first inmate to survive a lethal injection procedure, despite 
the record of inept executions). 
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used it anyway, only to botch his execution.
78
 Similarly, despite 
numerous reports about the dangers of compounded drugs, states 
press forward with executions relying on such drugs without sub-
jecting them to chemical testing that might identify flaws.
79
 In 
short, states may not always fully appreciate the risks their exe-
cution procedures create, but they sometimes do and still refuse 
to alter their behavior. 
B.  Structural Explanations 
Another set of explanations is structural. These explanations 
stem from the nature of state governments and the incentives 
that help govern state official behavior. As with the other expla-
nations, these likely do not each apply to each official in each 
state. Nevertheless, they help provide a sense of another set of is-
sues that may shape officials‘ actions. 
1.  State Sovereignty 
As a general matter, states usually do not like being told what 
to do. States prize their sovereignty and strongly resist outside 
efforts to encroach upon their prerogative to set and implement 
policy.
80
 Accordingly, their natural inclination is often to fight an-
yone who contends that they must change their practices.
81
 In-
deed, whether pressures come from the federal government, in-
 
 78. See Alan Johnson, Prison Official Had Predicted Ohio’s Troubling Execution, 
COLUM. DISPATCH (Aug. 19, 2014, 4:44 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories 
/local/2014/08/19/execution-scenario-had-been-predicted.html (discussing an e-mail sent by 
the former chief legal counsel for the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction 
speculating that the drug combination Ohio planned to use would result in ―the con-
demned gasping for air in hyperventilating fashion‖). 
 79. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1419–21 (discussing the possibility of chemi-
cal testing); Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1360–61, 1365–66 (discussing the shortage of 
lethal injection drugs and the risks of compounding pharmacies). 
 80. See generally Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 
1521 (1994) (exploring the politics of federalism); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee 
Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 78 
(1988) (arguing that as republican governments, states should enjoy discretion to run their 
governments as autonomous units without outside interference). 
 81. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federal-
ism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1258–59 (2009) (discussing ―uncooperative federalism‖ when 
states resist federal policies that intrude on pre-existing state policies). 
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terest groups, or death row inmates, states often resist external 
efforts to change the way they do things.
82
 
None of this is to say that state politicians and officials should 
necessarily concede to outside efforts to change their practices. 
States sometimes have very good reason to resist external inter-
ference in their affairs.
83
 Nevertheless, states also sometimes re-
flexively resist external advice or pressure, even when it may be 
wiser to reconsider their current policies. In other words, states‘ 
zealous protection of their sovereignty, however justifiable in 
some contexts, may in other contexts sometimes lead to an obdu-
rate refusal to revise questionable practices.
84
 
This obduracy may be especially commonplace in the context of 
prisons, where states have grown very accustomed to operating in 
secrecy and receiving great deference from courts.
85
 DOCs, in-
deed, are often successful in fending off lawsuits and other exter-
nal meddling.
86
 As a result, states may be disinclined to consider 
 
 82. See, e.g., Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 
(2012) (discussing state objection to federal Medicaid expansion even though the federal 
government paid the entire amount in the early years and no less than 90% after 2016); 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149, 151, 154 (1992) (objecting to the federal 
program regulating how states handle radioactive waste even though states had requested 
the federal plan for disposing of such waste); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205, 211 
(1987) (objecting to the federal plan raising the minimum drinking age that threatened to 
withhold 5% of federal highway funds from states that did not comply). 
 83. Cf. Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 31, 
84 (2013) (noting the severity of the public pension crisis on state and local governments 
and the need for states to find creative ways to save money); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From 
Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 
341, 402 (1985) (―[I]f there is some genuine room for noninstrumental participation in 
American political life, it can realistically exist only on the local level.‖). 
 84. See Thomas O. McGarity, Regulating Commuters to Clear the Air: Some Difficul-
ties in Implementing a National Program at the Local Level, 27 PAC. L.J. 1521, 1523 (1996) 
(discussing limited progress in air quality in the face of states‘ resistance to the implemen-
tation of the Clean Air Act). 
 85. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. VIII, 110 Stat. 
1321; Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90–91 (1987) (noting that ―courts should be particular-
ly conscious of the ‗measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials‘‖ and uphold-
ing a rule barring inmate-to-inmate correspondence) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 
817, 827 (1974)); Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Deci-
sion Making, 98 IOWA L. REV. 465, 485–87 (2013) (discussing courts‘ practices of deferring 
to state prisons). 
 86. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 362 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(―[C]ourts have been especially deferential to prison authorities ‗in the adoption and exe-
cution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal or-
der and discipline and to maintain institutional security.‘‖) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. 520, 547 (1979)); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974), overruled in 
part by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413–14 (1989) (―[F]ederal courts have adopted 
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outside criticism about lethal injection because they are used to 
insulating their prison systems from external review.
87
 
To this extent, secrecy and intransigence can work hand in 
hand. If states are not transparent about the details of their exe-
cution procedures, inmates lack the necessary information to 
mount a serious Eighth Amendment challenge to the procedure.
88
 
Relatedly, without detailed information about states‘ procedures, 
outsiders have a hard time explaining precisely why those proce-
dures may be dangerous. Secrecy, then, helps preserve the state‘s 
sovereign prerogative to administer its own execution procedures. 
A related factor is that states are understandably sensitive to 
costs. States may believe that modifying their lethal injection 
procedures would cost them money, because they will have to buy 
new drugs, rethink their procedures‘ details, and potentially hire 
and train new personnel. The death penalty is already extremely 
expensive,
89
 and states may resist constant calls for revisions that 
may cost even more, especially given that capital inmates will 
continue to challenge even the safest procedures. Relatedly, 
states may sometimes lack the resources to focus on improving 
lethal injections because other issues demand correctional offi-
cials‘ more immediate attention.
90
 
Of course, litigation is a large reason for capital punishment‘s 
high price tag, so states‘ resistance to external advice may, para-
 
a broad hands-off attitude toward problems of prison administration. . . . [T]he problems of 
prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readi-
ly susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, 
and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the 
legislative and executive branches of government.‖). 
 87. See infra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 88. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1372. 
 89. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Cost and Capital Punishment: A New 
Consideration Transforms an Old Debate, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 117, 118 (2010) (discuss-
ing how the cost of the death penalty has increased in the modern era and has been a 
prominent issue causing states to reconsider restricting the death penalty); Richard C. Di-
eter, Millions Misspent: What Politicians Don’t Say About the High Costs of the Death 
Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (1994), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/599 
(―Death penalty cases are much more expensive than other criminal cases and cost more 
than imprisonment for life with no possibility of parole.‖). 
 90. See, e.g., Martha Stoddard, Jon Bruning Says Other Crises Have ‘Diverted’ State 
from Resolving Lethal Injection Problems, OMAHA.COM (Oct. 28, 2014, 1:00 AM), http://w 
ww.omaha.com/news/crime/jon-bruning-says-other-crises-have-diverted-state-from-resolvi 
ng/article_a2e13833-6364-510e-8557-0c10e5d69d90.html (explaining that a Nebraska 
state prison sentencing fiasco diverted official money and attention from improving lethal 
injection). 
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doxically, sometimes cost them more than acquiescence would.
91
 
That said, states, as already noted, often protect themselves from 
these additional litigation costs by keeping their procedures a se-
cret, thereby depriving inmates of the opportunity to mount a 
successful challenge. To this extent, state obduracy can resist the 
expense of changing execution procedures and state secrecy can 
keep litigation costs down by insulating those procedures from 
meaningful judicial review.
92
 
2.  Administrative Structures 
It is important to remember that the most important decisions 
about lethal injection are made not by state legislatures but by 
administrative agencies, usually DOCs. To be sure, in some 
states, legislatures designate the drugs for lethal injection by 
statute.
93
 In most death penalty states, however, the legislature 
delegates authority to make such determinations to DOCs.
94
 More 
importantly, even where the legislature selects the drugs, DOCs 
design and implement the procedures‘ details.
95
 Accordingly, state 
executive officials necessarily make crucial decisions that deter-
mine the nature and safety of lethal injection. 
 
 91. See, e.g., LEGIS. AUDITOR, STATE OF NEV., PERFORMANCE AUDIT: FISCAL COSTS OF 
THE DEATH PENALTY (2014) (concluding that case costs of pursing the death penalty aver-
age three times more than non-death penalty cases due to procedural safeguards); PETER 
A. COLLINS ET AL., SEATTLE UNIV., AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF SEEKING THE 
DEATH PENALTY IN WASHINGTON STATE 4 (2015) (indicating that average trial level de-
fense and prosecution costs are 2.8 to 4.2 times more expensive in death penalty cases 
than non-death penalty cases). 
 92. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1411. 
 93. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 137.473 (Cum. Supp. 2014) (―The punishment of death 
shall be inflicted by the intravenous administration of a lethal quantity of an ultra-short-
acting barbiturate in combination with a chemical paralytic agent and potassium chloride 
or other equally effective substances sufficient to cause death.‖). 
 94. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1 (2011 Repl. Vol.) (―A death sentence shall be exe-
cuted by lethal injection, unless the person sentenced to death affirmatively elects to be 
executed by electrocution.‖); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-757(A) (2009) (―The penalty of death 
shall be inflicted by an intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quan-
tity sufficient to cause death, under the supervision of the state department of correc-
tions.‖). 
 95. See, e.g., Letter from Michael D. Crews, Sec‘y of the Fla. Dep‘t of Corr., to Rick 
Scott, Governor of Fla. (Sept. 9, 2013), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/doc 
uments/FLExecProtocol.pdf (discussing the Department of Corrections‘ responsibility of 
implementing lethal injection procedures in Florida); Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 
1391 nn.164, 165 (citing two manuals published by state DOCs). 
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The institutional structures of DOCs, therefore, substantially 
shape the states‘ attitudes towards lethal injection. Like many 
administrative agents, DOC officials can suffer from tunnel vi-
sion, prioritizing narrow agency objectives more than broader so-
cial or constitutional values.
96
 Indeed, like other administrative 
agencies, DOCs typically have narrow statutory mandates, which 
do not always include a broad commitment to the rule of law and 
constitutional norms.
97
 
If anything, DOCs may be even more prone to tunnel vision 
than other administrative agencies, because state administrative 
law often exempts DOCs from ordinary administrative accounta-
bility mechanisms, such as state Administrative Procedure Acts 
and Freedom of Information Acts.
98
 As a result, the institutional 
incentives of DOCs in the death penalty context are likely to focus 
more on carrying out executions expeditiously and less on Eighth 
Amendment norms.
99
 States‘ willingness to procure lethal drugs 
from any willing source, including sketchy fly-by-night overseas 
 
 96. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1408–09; Stephen Breyer, The Executive 
Branch, Administrative Action, and Comparative Expertise, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2189, 
2195 (2011); Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment ―Due Process,‖ 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 
523 (1970). 
 97. See Glen Staszewski, Statutory Interpretation as Contestatory Democracy, 55 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 221, 257 (2013) (―[A]dministrative discretion has always been feared on 
the grounds that agencies might adopt ‗tunnel vision.‘ . . .‖). 
 98. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617(g) (2013) (―The procedures [regarding lethal injec-
tion and its implementation] are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act of 1967.‖); MO. REV. STAT. § 536.010(6)(k) (2000) (exempting a ―statement con-
cerning only inmates of an institution under the control of the department of corrections‖ 
from the definition of a ―rule‖); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-31.2 (2014) (classifying as 
―confidential‖ the ―name, address, qualifications, and other identifying information relat-
ing to the identity of any person or entity supplying or administering the intravenous in-
jection substance or substances‖ and treating disclosure of such information as a misde-
meanor); TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-504(h)(1) (2014) (treating records identifying 
individuals or entities ―directly involved in the process of executing a sentence of death . . . 
as confidential [and stating that they] shall not be open to public inspection‖); Id. § 4-5 
102(12)(G) (2011) (exempting ―[s]tatements concerning inmates of a correctional . . . facili-
ty‖ from the definition of a ―rule‖); Jackson v. Danberg (No. 07M-09-141), 2008 WL 
1850585, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2008) (holding that Delaware‘s lethal injection 
protocol is not subject to state APA); Order Denying Temporary Restraining Order And/Or 
Stay at 4, Hightower v. Donald (No. 2007CV135682), 2007 WL 4355844, at *2 (Ga. Super. 
Ct. July 16, 2007) (―[T]he promulgation of these protocols regarding lethal injection by the 
[Georgia] Department of Corrections are not subject to the requirements of the APA.‖); 
Middleton v. Mo. Dep‘t of Corrs., 278 S.W.3d 193, 198 (Mo. 2009) (en banc) (holding that 
an execution protocol is not a rule and is therefore not subject to the state APA); Ab-
dur‘Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 311 (Tenn. 2005) (interpreting the Tennessee 
Uniform Administrative Procedure Act so as not to reach lethal injection). 
 99. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1374. 
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dealers, strongly suggests that their primary goal is to carry out 
executions, not to ensure that their execution procedures are 
safe.
100
 Similarly, the continued use of paralytics helps demon-
strate that some states are more concerned with the appearance 
than the reality of their executions.  
The institutional hierarchy of state governments may also help 
explain state behavior in this area. Executions are a grisly busi-
ness, and many state officials simply may not want to deal with it 
themselves. Some officials, then, may want to pass the responsi-
bility to others, delegating the procedure to independent contrac-
tors or to prison guards and officials who lack the training and 
expertise to administer the procedures correctly.
101
 
Remarkably, these delegations often provide for no accountabil-
ity. For example, Missouri for years delegated its execution pro-
cedure to a doctor, who lowered the amount of anesthetic and 
made other changes to the procedure without the knowledge of 
correctional authorities.
102
 Missouri delegated ―total discretion‖ 
over its procedure to this doctor and did not oversee his actions.
103
 
As a result, the State did not know that this doctor‘s dyslexia 
made him unsure as to how much anesthetic he had prepared for 
executions.
104
 Nor did it check the execution log to learn that the 
drug doses had varied between executions.
105
 Nevertheless, even 
though state officials did virtually nothing to oversee this doctor‘s 
decisions, it vigorously resisted all efforts to inquire into its exe-
cution methods.
106
 
 
 100. See James Gibson & Corinna Barrett Lain, Death Penalty Drugs & the Interna-
tional Moral Marketplace, 103 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 10), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2524124; Owen Bowcott, London 
Firm Supplied Drugs for U.S. Executions, GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2011, 12:45 PM), http:// 
www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/06/london-firm-supplied-drugs-us-executions. 
 101. Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law 
Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2083 (2011) [hereinafter 
Berger, Norms]. 
 102. Taylor v. Crawford (No. 05-4173-CV-C-FJG), 2006 WL 1779035, at *7 (W.D. Mo. 
June 26, 2006); Transcript of Testimony of John Doe No. 1 at 96–98, Taylor, 2006 WL 
1779035 [hereinafter Doe Deposition]. 
 103. See Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *7. 
 104. See id. (―John Doe I also testified that he felt that he had the authority to change 
or modify the formula as he saw fit. It is apparent that he has changed and modified the 
protocol on several occasions in the past.‖); Doe Deposition, supra note 102, at 25 (―I am 
dyslexic and so . . . it‘s not unusual for me to make mistakes.‖). 
 105. See Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *7; Berger, Remedies, supra note 4, at 305. 
 106. See, e.g., Defendant‘s Response to Motion to Compel Discovery at 6, Clemons v. 
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From a human perspective, it is understandable that individu-
al officials would not want to engage closely with lethal injection 
if they do not have to. Presumably, even some strong supporters 
of capital punishment feel uneasy ending another human being‘s 
life. Moreover, lethal injection falls far outside the expertise of 
most DOC and prison officials, so many such officials may be re-
lieved to rid themselves of this assignment. However, states dele-
gation practices can make lethal injection more dangerous be-
cause the people implementing the procedure often lack the 
expertise to do their tasks well. 
Relatedly, delegation can also insulate lethal injection from 
much needed revision. After all, the prison employees and inde-
pendent contractors who frequently implement lethal injection 
may not have the institutional authority to make changes to the 
procedure themselves, even if they recognize problems. In other 
words, even if the agents recognize problems, they may think 
they lack the legal or political authority to make major changes. 
Oklahoma‘s protocol, for example, vests entire discretion in the 
prison warden to deal with problems that may arise.
107
 During the 
botched execution of Clayton Lockett, initial attempts to insert 
the catheter into various veins failed.
108
 The responsible physi-
cian, therefore, attempted to set the catheter in the femoral vein, 
even though he did not have the proper sized catheter to access 
it.
109
 Perhaps if this doctor had played a larger role in designing 
and administering the procedure, he would have prepared for this 
contingency in advance. Alternatively, if the Oklahoma protocol 
had not vested entire discretion in the warden, perhaps this doc-
tor could have halted the execution until the proper equipment 
became available. Instead, the doctor proceeded, even though he 
had never before attempted femoral access with such a short 
catheter.
110
 
 
Crawford (No. 07-4129-CV-C-FJG), 2008 WL 2783233 (W.D. Mo. July 15, 2008); Berger, 
Remedies, supra note 4, at 305. 
 107. See ANITA TRAMMELL, OKLA. ST. PENITENTIARY, PROCEDURES FOR THE EXECUTION 
OF OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO DEATH 15–18 (2014). 
 108. See Lockett Execution Report, supra note 27, at 15–16. 
 109. Id. at 16 (noting that attempts to find a ―needle/catheter‖ between 1¾ inches and 
2½ inches failed and that the largest available was only 1¼ inches). 
 110. See id. 
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State secrecy likely exacerbates these institutional problems. 
The physician and paramedic who attempted to set the catheter 
in Lockett‘s execution proceeded anonymously.
111
 Accordingly, 
public disclosure of the botch would not immediately reflect badly 
on them, because the general public did not know their names.
112
 
However, these individuals were, of course, known within the 
prison, and presumably felt pressure from public officials to pro-
ceed with the execution, even when IV access was difficult to se-
cure. Perhaps if the officials publicly responsible for the proce-
dure were the same people who implemented the procedure‘s 
difficult steps (such as setting the catheter), states would be more 
likely to make revisions to guard against such botches. 
Secrecy coupled with delegation, thus, makes it easier for 
states to hide who is truly responsible. Though high-level officials 
are ostensibly responsible for execution procedures, they usually 
are not the actual people mixing the drugs, setting the catheter, 
and monitoring an inmate‘s consciousness. Of course, no official 
wants to see an execution botched on her watch, but when so 
many aspects of a procedure are delegated down an institution‘s 
hierarchy, it may be easier for officials to tell themselves that 
particular issues are not their responsibility.
113
 The problem al-
ways lies at someone else‘s feet. 
3.  The Structure of Constitutional Tort Law 
It is finally worth briefly noting that state officials and execu-
tion team members likely will not face legal repercussions if the 
lethal injection procedures they design and implement cause suf-
fering. First, because many states still use paralytics as part of 
their procedures, inmates might feel pain that observers cannot 
detect.
114
 Second, even when inmates seem to have suffered, 
 
 111. See TRAMMELL, supra note 107, at 8, 14. 
 112. A lawsuit filed by Clayton Lockett‘s family has since identified the doctor by 
name. See Complaint at 7, Estate of Lockett v. Fallin et al., No. CIV-14-1119-HE (W.D. 
Okla. Oct. 13, 2014). 
 113. Cf. Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 
YALE L.J. 1032, 1078 (2011) (―When authority is allocated down within an agency, . . . . 
[this will] reduce the political responsiveness of agency decisionmaking.‖). 
 114. See Suzanne C. Beyea, Addressing the Trauma of Anesthesia Awareness, 81 AORN 
603, 603 (2005). 
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states often claim that they did not.
115
 While these objections may 
seem implausible, it is hard to prove that an inmate felt pain be-
cause he is deceased and obviously cannot testify as to his experi-
ence. Third, were an inmate‘s family to bring an action against a 
state or state officials to recover for a botched execution, immuni-
ty doctrines would likely protect the state and its officials from 
money damages.
116
 More specifically, state sovereign immunity 
prohibits monetary awards against the state in the absence of a 
statute waiving or abrogating such immunity, and qualified im-
munity would make it difficult to recover monetary damages from 
responsible state officials.
117
 To this extent, the structure of con-
stitutional tort law permits state officials to operate in this area 
without worrying too much about serious personal consequences 
if things go awry. 
While most state officials will not deliberately cause harm, they 
also operate in a world knowing that their mistakes will likely 
not subject them to serious legal consequences. Moreover, because 
states (understandably) keep the identity of their lethal injection 
teams a secret, many participants in lethal injection administra-
tion also do not risk public embarrassment. To be sure, high-level 
officials, such as prison wardens and directors of DOCs, may re-
ceive some public criticism for botched executions, but they often 
are not directly involved in the administration of lethal drugs and 
therefore can plausibly deflect the blame.
118
 
C.  Strategic Explanations 
States also have strategic reasons for acting the way they do. 
Viewed through this lens, states resist disclosing or revising their 
 
 115. See Botelho & Ford, supra note 10. 
 116. The families of Dennis McGuire and Clayton Lockett are currently suing state of-
ficials for their botched executions in Ohio and Oklahoma, respectively. See generally 
Complaint, McGuire v. Mohr, No. 14-cv-00093 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 24, 2014); Complaint, In re 
Lockett, No. CIV-14-1119-HE (W.D. Okla. Oct. 13, 2014) (showing that the families of 
Lockett and McGuire are suing their respective states for violating the Eighth Amend-
ment during the respective executions). 
 117. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (hold-
ing that ―government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded 
from [civil] liability [so long as] their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights‖); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974) (limiting Ex Parte 
Young to prospective, rather than retrospective, relief). 
 118. Indeed, as noted above, these officials may even have an incentive to delegate the 
procedure to other people. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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execution procedures to help them defend lawsuits today, ward 
off more litigation tomorrow, preserve the death penalty more 
generally, and protect state fiscal concerns. As with the other ex-
planations, these motives can interact with each other and with 
other categories of explanations. 
1.  Litigation Strategy 
Inmates frequently bring suits under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 
challenging lethal injection procedures on Eighth Amendment 
grounds.
119
 States predictably try to fend off such lawsuits. State 
secrecy is an especially effective litigation tactic. Because states 
often withhold many important details of their lethal injection 
procedures, inmates bringing section 1983 actions often lack im-
portant information bearing on the risk of pain. Without such in-
formation, it is impossible to establish that the procedure in ques-
tion creates a substantial risk of serious pain, because both the 
lawyers and the judge lack crucial facts. Of course, if courts com-
pelled states to turn over such details during the course of discov-
ery, then secrecy would not be an effective litigation tactic. How-
ever, courts rarely require states to make such disclosures, so 
state secrecy has in fact proven to be a successful litigation strat-
egy thus far.
120
 
Some state officials may also refuse to substantially rethink 
their lethal injection procedures as part of a broader strategy to 
persuade courts that there is nothing wrong with them. Were 
states to concede the flaws in their procedures, courts may take 
inmates‘ Eighth Amendment challenges seriously. As things 
stand, courts very rarely rule against states in these cases.
121
 
From the perspective of litigation strategy, the states have good 
reason to continue pretending that nothing is wrong. 
In fairness, many states may also believe that the inmates‘ 
Eighth Amendment challenges are bogus.
122
 To this extent, states 
may feel like their litigation strategies are justified methods of 
trying to discourage frivolous litigation that consumes state time 
 
 119. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 120. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1371, 1373. 
 121. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1606 (2003). 
 122. See supra Part II.A. But see supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
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and money. The fact that prison inmates litigate various issues 
frequently through habeas and section 1983 actions likely further 
adds to the states‘ belief that lethal injection challenges ought not 
to be taken seriously.
123
 Indeed, by painting lethal injection ac-
tions as frivolous, states signal to courts that they should not 
spend much time on them. Of course, courts owe inmates an in-
dependent review of the issues, but, to date, states often have 
successfully persuaded courts that inmates‘ objections to their le-
thal injection procedures are not worthy of anything beyond the 
most minimal judicial resources.
124
 
2.  Preserving the Death Penalty 
State officials also care about preserving capital punishment 
more generally. This consideration helps explain both state in-
transigence and state secrecy. State politicians and correctional 
officials may resist modifying their procedures, and in particular 
the drugs they use, because they fear that changes may jeopard-
ize their ability to carry out executions at all. It can be difficult 
for states to find a readily and consistently available supply of 
drugs.
125
 Sometimes, states are forced to change drugs because 
they can no longer get their old drugs, but when states have ac-
cess to a particular drug source, they usually resist changes be-
cause an alternative can be difficult to find.
126
 Moreover, many 
drugs also have expiration dates, so states cannot stockpile the 
drugs for use in future years.
127
  
 
 123. See Schlanger, supra note 121, at 1557 (―In 1995, prison and jail inmates brought 
about 40,000 new lawsuits in federal court—nearly a fifth of the federal civil docket.‖). 
 124. See, e.g., Felder v. Johnson, 180 F.3d 206, 215 (5th Cir. 1999) (describing the claim 
that the state‘s lethal injection procedures violated the Eighth Amendment as ―border[ing] 
on the legally frivolous‖); Fitzpatrick v. Bradshaw, No. 1:06–cv–356, 2008 WL 7055605, at 
*62 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (dismissing the claim as ―without merit‖); Murphy v. Sirmons, 497 F. 
Supp. 2d 1257, 1292–94 (E.D. Okla. 2007) (rejecting the lethal injection claim as ―frivo-
lous‖); Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1387, 1425. 
 125. See Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1366 (noting the ―quandary‖ states face of hav-
ing to use compounding pharmacies as a result of drug shortages). 
 126. See id. at 1362–66; Gibson & Lain, supra note 100 (manuscript at 12–14). 
 127. See, e.g., Ed Pilkington, Georgia Rushes Through Executions Before Lethal Injec-
tion Drugs Expire, GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 2013, 12:35 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2013/feb/21/georgia-executions-lethal-injection-drug-pentobarbital (discussing Geor-
gia‘s hasty execution of Andrew Allen Cook ―amid a legal scramble to carry out capital 
sentences before its supply of lethal injection drugs reache[d] its expiry date‖). 
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States also fear that disclosing information about their lethal 
injection procedures, especially the names of their drug providers, 
will jeopardize their ability to carry out executions at all. Major 
pharmaceutical companies in recent years have stopped providing 
drugs to states for use in executions.
128
 As a result, states have 
had to turn to other sources for their drugs, especially compound-
ing pharmacies.
129
 Inmates object that because compounding 
pharmacies escape many FDA regulations, their products often 
have not been evaluated for effectiveness and safety.
130
 There is 
voluminous scientific evidence about the risks posed by some 
compounded drugs,
131
 but states, for their part, worry that pres-
sure on compounding pharmacies might scare them away, further 
drying up viable lethal drugs. 
To this extent, states promote secrecy so as to insulate com-
pounding pharmacies from external pressure and harassment 
that may dissuade them from continuing to supply drugs for exe-
cutions.
132
 Pharmacies, for their part, want to avoid bad publicity 
linking them with executions. For example, in February 2014, a 
 
 128. Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1380–81; Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1360–
65. 
 129. Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1382. ―[U]nlike ‗Big Pharma‘ manufacturing facil-
ities, [compounding pharmacies] are subject to less rigorous, consistent regulation.‖ Id.; 
see also 21 U.S.C. § 353(a) (2012) (providing exceptions from other regulations for com-
pounded drugs meeting certain requirements); Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 1367; Gib-
son & Lain, supra note 100 (manuscript at 18) (discussing the differences between ―Big 
Pharma‖ drugs and compounded drugs). 
 130. See, e.g., Plaintiff‘s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary In-
junction at 1–2, Taylor v. Apothecary Shoppe, LLC (No. 14-CV-063-TCK-TLW), 2014 WL 
631664 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 18, 2014) (challenging the compounding pharmacy‘s alleged pro-
vision of drugs for lethal injection). 
 131. See Berger, Secrecy, supra note 4, at 1382–84; Denno, Chaos, supra note 4, at 
1369–71 (summarizing FDA reports regarding the risks of compounding pharmacies). 
 132. See Editorial: Greg Abbott Switches Position on Death Row Drugs Sources, STAR- 
TELEGRAM (June 1, 2014, 9:31 AM), http://www.star-telegram.com/opinion/editorials/arti 
cle3860246.html; Gary Grado, State Secret: Arizona Tries to Conceal Identity of Firm That 
Makes Chemical for Lethal Injections, ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES (Oct. 14, 2013, 7:52 AM), http: 
//azcapitoltimes.com/news/2013/10/14/state-secret-arizona-tries-to-conceal-identity-of-firm-
that-makes-chemical-for-lethal-injections/ (discussing the backlash, hate mail, and har-
assment received by compounding pharmacies); Brandi Grissom, TDCJ Refuses to Return 
Execution Drugs to Pharmacist, TEX. TRIB. (Oct. 7, 2013), https://www.texastribune.org/ 
2013/10/07/tdcj-refuses-return-execution-drugs-pharmacist/ (describing hate mail a com-
pounding pharmacy received after it became public that it had provided drugs to Texas for 
use in executions); Ed Pilkington, Texas Accuses Anti-Death Penalty Charity Reprieve of 
Fomenting Violence, GUARDIAN (Mar. 28, 2012, 12:36 PM), http://www.theguardian.com 
/world/2012/mar/28/death-penalty-texas-reprieve (noting the intimidation and harassment 
of manufacturers of drugs used in lethal injections). 
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compounding pharmacy sued by a death row inmate opted to set-
tle the case, agreeing not to provide drugs for executions but also 
refusing to acknowledge that it had ever planned to do so.
133
 Rec-
ognizing that many pharmacies want to avoid public relations 
problems, states believe secrecy helps them protect their remain-
ing drug sources and thereby preserve capital punishment more 
generally. 
D.  Political Explanations 
A final set of explanations for state behavior in this area is po-
litical. Prominent public officials, in particular, can use their ac-
tions and statements about lethal injection to signal that they are 
tough on crime.
134
 Relatedly, state officials may want to signal to 
victims‘ families and the public in general that they are doing 
everything they can to carry out justice expeditiously. Indeed, 
state officials frequently remind the public of the victim‘s suffer-
ing at the time of executions, even after botched executions.
135
 
This political explanation might have more resonance in states 
like Texas and Oklahoma where support for the death penalty is 
very strong, but even in other states, some state officials likely 
feel that they have an obligation to the public to carry out lawful-
ly imposed sentences. Indeed, Democratic politicians in some 
states may feel additional pressure to support capital punishment 
to burnish their anti-crime credentials and dispel concerns that 
they are not sufficiently tough for public office.
136
 
 
 133. See Gibson & Lain, supra note 100 (manuscript at 19); ASSOC. PRESS, Tulsa 
Pharmacy Agrees Not to Provide Execution Drug, CBS NEWS (Feb. 17, 2014, 11:32 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/oklahoma-pharmacy-agrees-not-to-provide-drug-for-execu 
tion/. 
 134. See John Caniglia, Lawmakers Seek Alternatives to Lethal Injection, As Death 
Penalty Becomes Mired in Litigation, CLEVELAND.COM (Feb. 24, 2014, 7:27 AM), http:// 
www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2014/02/state_lawmakers_seek_alternati.html. 
 135. See Erik Eckholm, IV Misplaced in Oklahoma Execution, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 4, 2014, at A14.  
 136. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, The 1992 Campaign: Death Penalty; Arkansas Execu-
tion Raises Questions on Governor’s Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 1992), http://www.nytim 
es.com/1992/01/25/us/1992-campaign-death-penalty-arkansas-execution-raises-questions- 
governor-s.html (describing then-presidential candidate and Governor of Arkansas Bill 
Clinton‘s decision to withhold executive clemency for the controversial execution of Ricky 
Ray Rector so as not to appear soft on crime); Gregory Kline, State Democrats Are Soft on 
Crime, BALT. SUN (Feb. 13, 2014, 8:36 AM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/ 
oped/bs-ed-red-maryland-0214-20140213-story.html (lambasting Governor O‘Malley who 
recently abolished the death penalty in Maryland for being soft on crime). 
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Elected officials also may resist careful appraisal of their pro-
cedures, because such appraisal may require substantially new 
procedures, which would take time to implement. Some changes 
require legislation, which obviously can be time consuming. Even 
changes that do not require a new statute can require states to 
procure new drugs, find new personnel, and design and practice 
new procedures. Victims‘ families and some members of the pub-
lic are already frustrated that the period between sentencing and 
execution is so long,
137
 and state officials often do not want to add 
to this frustration.
138
 
It is even possible that some officials are so callous that they do 
not care whether their execution procedures cause pain. It is 
doubtful that this explanation is correct often, but it is possible 
that the occasional official sees a painful death as part of the ret-
ribution the condemned deserves. Perhaps more likely is the pos-
sibility that some state officials do not intend to cause the inmate 
pain but also feel that given the inmate‘s terrible crime, they 
ought not spend excessive time and resources designing the safest 
execution procedures.
139
 
III.  CONCLUSION:  THE EXECUTIONERS‘ DILEMMAS 
When I litigated the constitutionality of Missouri‘s lethal injec-
tion procedure in 2006 and 2007,
140
 I did not come away with the 
 
 137. See TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUST., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2012-STATISTICAL 
TABLES 14 (2014), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/ cp12st.pdf 
(noting the mean lapse in time between sentencing and execution for inmates in 2012 was 
just under sixteen years); see also Adam Liptak, Lifelong Death Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 1, 2011, at A16 (―[Five] percent of the 5826 death sentences imposed from 1973 to 
1995 were carried out in those years.‖). 
 138. See, e.g., Michael Smerconish, Death Sentences Too Often Punish Victim’s Fami-
ly—Not the Killer, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Aug. 3, 2014, 8:08 PM), http://www.dallasnews. 
com/opinion/latest-columns/20140803-death-sentences-too-often-punish-victims-family--
not-the-killer.ece. 
 139. Cf. Tina Rosenberg, The Deadlist D.A., N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 1995), http://www.ny 
times.com/1995/07/16/magazine/the-deadliest-da.html?pagewanted=all (statement by 
Philadelphia District Attorney) (―I‘ve looked at all those sentenced to be executed. No one 
will shed a tear. Prison is too good for them. They don‘t deserve to live. I represent the vic-
tim and the family. I don‘t care about killers.‖).  
 140. See Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007); Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-
4173-CV-C-FJG, 2006 WL 1779035 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006); Eric Berger, Thoughts on 
LB 36: Problems with the Proposed Bill to Institute Lethal Injection in Nebraska, 1 NEB. L. 
REV. BULL. 14, 15 (2009), http://lawreviewbulletin.unl.edu/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/ber 
ger1.pdf. 
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impression that the responsible state officials were vicious people 
who enjoyed inflicting pain.
141
 Nor did I think that they had made 
the decision to ignore the Constitution and get away with what 
they could. Rather, I think the State had given some employees a 
difficult task for which they were mostly poorly qualified. Some of 
the participants may have been overconfident or even arrogant. 
Some were careless. Still others were probably out of their depth, 
tasked with an extremely difficult job without the training or re-
sources to even know where to begin. On the whole, though, these 
were people trying to do a job that the state had decided was im-
portant and had assigned to them. 
To be sure, the precise motives of the various state actors dif-
fer. Each class of actors confronts separate incentives, pressures, 
and problems. Generally speaking, politicians, such as governors 
and elected attorneys general, may reap most of the political ben-
efits (and bear most of the political risks) from refusing to alter 
lethal injection because this stance, usually oblivious to the de-
tails of lethal injection, signals that they are tough on crime.
142
 
Correctional officials, used to operating without oversight, may 
seek to avoid attention by delegating the matter down the prison 
bureaucracy or by outsourcing aspects of the procedure altogeth-
er.
 143
 Prison employee execution team members may just want to 
follow orders within the ordinary chain of command. The com-
monality, though, may be that while most of these people proba-
bly approve of capital punishment in theory, few relish the actual 
business of killing. 
If anything, the problems with lethal injection may not be be-
cause the procedure‘s participants are vicious people who want to 
inflict pain on ―the worst of the worst,‖ but because not enough 
qualified people have the stomach for it.
144
 In state after state, the 
practice has been for correctional officials to delegate the proce-
dure down the agency hierarchy or outsource it entirely.
145
 From a 
human perspective, it is entirely understandable that most people 
 
 141. See supra Part II.A (explaining that state officials may be convinced by experts 
that procedures are safe and may not truly understand the drugs and their risks). This 
impression is based on a combination of trial testimony, depositions, discovery documents, 
and various interactions from the litigation. Id. 
 142. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra notes 98, 101 and accompanying text. 
 144. See Denno, Paradox, supra note 4, at 66. 
 145. See Berger, Norms, supra note 101, at 2039. 
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would not want to take responsibility for the procedure them-
selves. This collective reluctance, however, is part of the problem. 
States have had trouble finding qualified people to design and 
implement their procedures, and individuals‘ reluctance to take 
charge of lethal injection has made it still harder for states to sys-
tematically address their procedures‘ dangers and to improve 
them in meaningful ways. 
Relatedly, to the extent lethal injection procedures sometimes 
cause excruciating pain, many participants can (perhaps fairly) 
claim that other members of the execution team bear more re-
sponsibility for those problems. Indeed, whether deliberately or 
not, states often design execution procedures in ways that shield 
participants‘ consciences from the feeling that they themselves 
were personally responsible for the killing.
146
 When the firing 
squad was commonplace, states frequently used multiple sharp 
shooters and gave many of them blanks.
147
 Lethal injection in-
volves many team members,
148
 thereby dividing responsibility in a 
way that might seem to avoid pinning moral accountability on 
any single person. Indeed, some states‘ procedures use multiple 
IV lines coming from a different room.
149
 Even within state bu-
reaucracies, numerous people have partial responsibility over le-
thal injection. Such structures help to obstruct change. 
This is not to excuse the mistakes these officials have made. On 
the contrary, many state officials deserve serious criticism for the 
way they have handled lethal injection,
150
 but it is also important 
to recognize the dilemmas these officials face. Indeed, various 
pressures make it hard for officials to take proactive steps to im-
prove the safety and transparency of lethal injection. While there 
is compelling evidence that lethal injection poses serious risks, 
state officials with inadequate information make decisions based 
 
 146. See Michael J. Osofsky, Albert Bandura & Philip G. Zimbardo, The Role of Moral 
Disengagement in the Execution Process, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 371, 385 (2005). 
 147. See LOUIS J. PALMER, JR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
COMPLETE GUIDE TO FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS 242 (2d ed. 2014) (―The use of blanks is 
done so that the firing squad team will not know who actually killed the prisoner.‖). 
 148. Kevin Bonsor, Methods of Execution Have Changed With the Times, USA TODAY 
(May 10, 2001, 2:36 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/science/stuffworks/2001-05 
-10-lethal-injection.htm. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Taylor v. Crawford (No. 05-4173-CV-C-FJG), 2006 WL 1779035, at *7–*8 (W.D. 
Mo. June 26, 2006) (finding the execution procedure unconstitutional). 
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on structural, strategic, and political concerns that might not be 
readily apparent to outsiders. Collectively, states‘ practices make 
executions more dangerous than they need to be, but given their 
resources, knowledge, institutional obligations, and political con-
straints, the collective behavior of state actors, while hardly 
commendable, is understandable. 
Indeed, even the execution team member who genuinely wants 
to encourage her state to substantially rethink its lethal injection 
procedure faces sizable obstacles. If she voices her concerns, she 
may risk angering political officials, her own administrative boss-
es, and even the general public. If this team member lacks a med-
ical background, she may doubt her own ability to make fixes that 
meaningfully improve the safety of lethal injections. If she does 
have a medical background, she may worry that helping to im-
prove the procedure may jeopardize her own standing in the med-
ical community and risk her medical license and livelihood.
151
 If 
she has qualms about capital punishment more generally, she 
may also try to remove herself from the team rather than try to 
improve the procedure. A well-intentioned execution team mem-
ber might, in other words, realize that a serious problem exists, 
but not know how to go about fixing it. Moreover, even if such a 
person were confident in her abilities to improve the system, she 
may lack the legal authority, political clout, or professional flexi-
bility to make the necessary changes. 
It is worth emphasizing that these pressures likely transcend 
the lethal injection setting and help explain official behavior in 
other contexts. The particulars would differ, of course, but when 
state officials take actions that violate people‘s rights (or risk vio-
lating people‘s rights), they may not set out to do so. Instead, a 
confluence of institutional pressures, epistemic limitations, stra-
tegic calculations, and political factors likely contribute to official 
behavior. Officials may end up disrespecting important constitu-
tional values, but more often than not, they likely feel various 
pressures to select the route they have chosen. To acknowledge 
 
 151. See Welsh-Huggins, supra note 67. Dr. Dershwitz, for instance, decided to stop 
testifying in lethal injection cases because he feared that the medical community may take 
action against him. Id. 
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these dilemmas is not to excuse constitutional violations, but ra-
ther to recognize that officials‘ jobs can be difficult and can pre-
sent situations with seemingly no good options. 
Of course, all this is speculative and general. State officials‘ 
behaviors differ from case to case, and no theory can fully explain 
official behavior in all instances. Nevertheless, when criticizing 
official governmental behavior, especially behavior that infringes 
on constitutional rights, we should remember that state officials 
usually act as they do for a reason. These reasons often do not 
justify their behavior, but they can help us better understand 
why states have bungled lethal injection so badly. 
 
